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If we take an active role in managing the planet, we will replace mystery and
beauty with lousy engineering.1
INTRODUCTION
In November 2009, the Wall Street Journal reported that China’s Weather
Modification Office started seeding clouds with silver iodide in an effort to
counteract a lingering drought in Beijing.2 Even though China intended this
* Juris Doctor Candidate, May 2015, William S. Boyd School of Law, University of Nevada, Las Vegas. Thank you to Dr. Shelley L. Hurt of California Polytechnic State University,
San Luis Obispo for mentoring me and helping me develop the foundation for this note during my time at Cal Poly.
1
JEFF GOODELL, HOW TO COOL THE PLANET: GEOENGINEERING AND THE AUDACIOUS QUEST
TO FIX EARTH’S CLIMATE 218 (2010).
2
Jason Dean, Blizzard Renews Storm over China Making Snow, WALL ST. J., Nov. 16,
2009, at A12; Clay Dillow, China’s Weather Manipulation Brings Crippling Snowstorm
to Beijing, POPULAR SCI. (Nov. 11, 2009), http://www.popsci.com/science/article
/2009-11/chinas-weather-manipulation-brings-crippling-snowstorm-beijing (“The Chinese
government employs the controversial practice of cloud seeding in an attempt to force precipitation in and around Beijing.”).
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procedure to produce local rain, it instead accidentally produced snowfall, leading to the biggest blizzard in China in over five decades.3 This incidental, manmade blizzard caused over $650 million worth of damage and forty deaths.4
Although unintended, this calamity stirred a controversial uproar over whether
state actors have the right to modify the weather or manipulate the climate.5
The United Nations—along with many scholars opposed to environmental
modification techniques—argued that the weather belongs to everyone, and because the environmental consequences can potentially be transnational, state
actors should not tamper with it.6 Further, opponents of environmental modification techniques argue that this science is underdeveloped and stress the potential harm to our ecosystems if a drastic modification of the environment occurs.7
Although China has practiced only small-scale and temporary weather
modification techniques, such as cloud seeding, its accidental blizzard exemplifies the exact problems that the international scientific community is currently
debating about geoengineering. Geoengineering is commonly defined as the
“deliberate large-scale intervention in the Earth’s climate system, in order to
moderate global warming.”8 Instead of regional weather modification techniques—like cloud seeding in order to produce local rain—geoengineering’s
effects go beyond state territories, and may encompass whole continents, or
even hemispheres. Stated simply, geoengineering is a form of weather modification, but on a global or hemispheric scale. The two terms—weather modification and geoengineering—can seem interchangeable at times because both sciences involve environmental modification techniques and can cause devastating
results. Nevertheless, this note distinguishes between the two sciences to
3

Dean, supra note 2.
Id.
5
Id. (“ ‘The weather belongs to everyone, not just to the Department of Artificial Interference with the Weather.’ ”) (quoting a blogger from Shou.com); see Suvi Huttunen & Mikael
Hildén, Framing the Controversial: Geoengineering in Academic Literature, 36 SCI. COMM.
3, 4 (2013) (“Geoengineering is novel and highly controversial.”); Scientists ‘Cause’ Beijing
Snow, BBC NEWS (Nov. 2, 2009 2:59 PM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific
/8337337.stm (stating that scientists are skeptical of the effectiveness of cloud seeding).
6
See generally Climate & Geoengineering, ETC GRP., http://www.etcgroup.org/issues
/climate-geoengineering (last visited May 27, 2015). Some of the main opponents of environmental modification techniques include the ETC group, which “calls for a ban” on geoengineering because it is a false solution to climate change. Id.
7
WSF 2013: Geoengineering: Resisting Climate Manipulation, ETC GRP. (Mar. 19, 2013),
http://www.etcgroup.org/content/wsf-2013-geoengineering-resisting-climate-manipulation.
8
ROYAL SOC’Y, GEOENGINEERING THE CLIMATE: SCIENCE, GOVERNANCE AND UNCERTAINTY,
at ix (2009), available at http://royalsociety.org/uploadedFiles/Royal_Society_Content
/policy/publications/2009/8693.pdf; see also INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE
CHANGE, IPCC EXPERT MEETING ON GEOENGINEERING, MEETING REPORT 2 (Ottmar Edenhofer et al. eds., 2012) [hereinafter IPCC MEETING REPORT], available at http://www
.ipcc-wg3.de/publications/supporting-material-1/EM-GeoE-Meeting-Report-final.pdf (finding that the term “geoengineering” encompasses a “broad, and ill-defined, variety of concepts for intentionally modifying the Earth’s climate at the large scale”).
4
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demonstrate geoengineering’s potential for even greater disaster than weather
modification.9
As demonstrated by the documentary Owning the Weather, many states,
private corporations, and even individuals increasingly use weather modification techniques to combat global warming, but weather modification is just a
limited, temporary fix.10 Although China’s weather modification techniques are
not as large-scale as geoengineering, the accidental Beijing disaster provides a
glimpse of the catastrophes geoengineering could cause before legal regulatory
mechanisms are set in place.
This issue of legal accountability for the potentially devastating effects of
geoengineering is an important matter of debate for the international scientific
community. For example, what would have happened if China’s man-made
blizzard had crossed into a neighboring country, killing civilians and causing
millions of dollars in damage? Would it be considered an act of war? Would
China be accountable for the destruction? Although it would have been logical
to address these issues before states began practicing environmental modification techniques,11 such discussion has not taken place.12 International law has
yet to catch up with this developing science. The Convention on the Prohibition
of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques, also known as ENMOD,13 is the only international legal mechanism
dealing with weather modification. Unfortunately, ENMOD is outdated in its
failure to regulate peaceful environmental modification techniques and to hold
state actors accountable for geoengineered weather.14 With no international legal agreement,15 state actors can perform this underdeveloped science, putting
citizens’ lives at risk without the fear of liability.
9
See infra note 11; see also IPCC MEETING REPORT, supra note 8 (“Geoengineering is different from weather modification . . . but the boundary can be fuzzy.”).
10
OWNING THE WEATHER (4th Row Films 2009).
11
For purposes of this note, I use the term “environmental modification techniques” to encompass both geoengineering and weather modification. Although weather modification is
small-scale compared to geoengineering, issues of accountability still must be addressed for
both sciences.
12
See Huttunen & Hildén, supra note 5, at 10 tbl.2 (“Geoengineering is essentially
a go
vernance issue, where the governance problems should be solved as soon as possible, before
the technology is applicable.”).
13
Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental
Modification Techniques, opened for signature May 18, 1977, 31 U.S.T. 333, 1108 U.N.T.S.
151 [hereinafter ENMOD].
14
See generally Bidisha Banerjee, ENMOD Squad: Could an Obscure Treaty Protect Developing Countries from Geoengineering Gone Wrong?, SLATE (Sept. 23, 2010, 11:00 AM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/future_tense/2010/09/enmod_squad.html (finding
that ENMOD would not cover geoengineering because of its peaceful purposes, “unless
someone could prove hostile intent”).
15
See IPCC MEETING REPORT, supra note 8, at 34 (“To date there has been little comprehensive assessment of the international regulation of geoengineering. Indeed, absent from
the current legal landscape is a single treaty or institution addressing all aspects of geoengineering; rather, the regulatory picture is a diverse and fragmented one both at the interna-
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Something must be done to eliminate the current lack of international law
to govern this potentially dangerous field of scientific study and practice.16 Geoengineering is no longer science fiction; it is being researched and developed
now, while weather modification is already a common practice in the United
States.17 Therefore, it is essential that international law catch up to the state-ofthe-art technological developments of today before a geoengineered catastrophe
occurs that, in comparison, makes the Beijing blizzard look like a fun snow
day. Without any sufficient legal mechanisms or precedents specific to environmental modification techniques, there is no consensus on the issue of liability resulting from geoengineered weather. Consequently, this note asks: how
can international law provide sufficient legal accountability in case of a catastrophic accident from geoengineering?
As this note shows through congressional hearings, newspaper articles, and
international agreements, geoengineering and weather modification have been
lingering matters in international law for several decades and will continue to
be reviewed, researched, and developed in the years to come. This note examines how international law can provide legal accountability for geoengineering
in the event of a catastrophic accident. First, Part I describes commonly proposed geoengineering techniques, coupled with the arguments for and against
geoengineering. Second, Part II evaluates four case studies—including
ENMOD—regarding relevant legal mechanisms to provide a legal precedent in
international disputes, accountability, regulation, and enforcement. Finally, Part
III interprets the evidence to assess the possible implications of international
law on geoengineering.
I.

GEOENGINEERING TECHNIQUES

To better recognize the catastrophic potential that geoengineering may
have on the planet, it is imperative to understand the techniques used in its
practice. However, before showcasing different geoengineering techniques and
the scientific community’s acceptance—or rejection—of these techniques, this

tional and national levels.”); see also KELSI BRACMORT & RICHARD K. LATTANZIO, CONG.
RESEARCH SERV., R41371, GEOENGINEERING: GOVERNANCE AND TECHNOLOGY POLICY 39
(2013) (“[I]n the United States, there is limited federal involvement in, or oversight of, geoengineering.”).
16
See Huttunen & Hildén, supra note 5, at 9 (“[T]he mere existence of geoengineering options needs regulation, irrespective of its actual effects or effectiveness.”).
17
OWNING THE WEATHER, supra note 10. According to the documentary, there are more
than fifty active weather modification programs in the United States alone. Id. Scientists are
already developing one type of geoengineering—the use of sulfate aerosols. Jonathan Benson, Scientist Terrified of Geoengineering Technology Being Developed under
Guise of Halting Global Warming, NAT. NEWS (Dec. 30, 2014), http://
www.naturalnews.com/048147_geoengineering_global_warming_chemtrails.html. (stating
that Dr. Matthew Watson of Bristol University is “working on a $2.8 million [sulfate aerosol] project”). For a discussion of sulfate aerosols, see infra Part I(B).
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note briefly discusses the practices of weather modification in order to substantiate the distinction between the two sciences.
A. Weather Modification and the Rise of Geoengineering
Weather modification techniques are regional and temporary modifications
on a small-scale. Cloud seeding is a very common form of weather modification.18 Cloud seeding—as used in the Beijing blizzard tragedy—is the process
of spreading dry ice or silver iodide in the upper parts of clouds to induce rain
or snowfall; this can be done by machine, plane, or even rockets to disperse the
dry ice, or more commonly, the silver iodide.19 The silver iodide dispersed into
the clouds clings to water molecules making the water molecules heavier.20
Consequently, these heavier water molecules will fall, turning into rain or
snow.21 This same technique was used in an attempt to weaken the wrath of
Hurricane Debbie in August of 1969.22 Although this experiment—called Project Stormfury—was not successful, it was a forerunner to modern geoengineering techniques.23
Contrary to the regional, temporary, and small-scale effects of weather
modification, geoengineering is the large-scale manipulation of the Earth’s climate to counteract the effects of global warming.24 Geoengineering is a hot topic because of the controversial issue of global warming, which estimates that
Earth’s temperature will “warm by 3 to 7 degrees Fahrenheit by the end of the
century and forecast[s] a future of melting glaciers, rising seas, epic droughts,
disease, and famine.”25 However, those forecasts are already out-of-date.26
Earth’s temperature is actually rising faster than predicted, rendering the climate impact much more severe.27 Instead of an increase of only three to seven
degrees, scientists now predict that the United States’ temperature could warm
by as much as “15 degrees Fahrenheit by the end of the century.”28 Conse18

See Virginia Simms, Comment, Making the Rain: Cloud Seeding, the Imminent Freshwater Crisis, and International Law, 44 INT’L LAW. 915, 916 (2010) (finding that over twentyseven countries engage in cloud seeding).
19
Id. at 919.
20
Id. at 918.
21
Id. at 919.
22
GOODELL, supra note 1, at 209; Jack Williams, Cloud Seeding Experiment Almost
Snarled Hurricane Camille Forecast, WASH. POST (Aug. 27, 2013), http://
www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/capital-weather-gang/wp/2013/08/27/cloud-seeding-ex
periment-almost-snarled-hurricane-camille-forecast/.
23
See ELI KINTISCH, HACK THE PLANET: SCIENCE’S BEST HOPE—OR WORST NIGHTMARE—
FOR AVERTING CLIMATE CATASTROPHE 87 (2010).
24
See ROYAL SOC’Y, supra note 8.
25
GOODELL, supra note 1, at 8 (referencing the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change’s Report).
26
Id.
27
Id.
28
Id. (indicating that the temperature increase may cause the sea levels to rise by as much as
nine feet).
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quently, “the public debate [has shifted] from how to stop global warming to
how we can live with it.”29 Hence, the idea of geoengineering became a possible solution to the global warming problem.
B. Geoengineering
Geoengineering proposals typically fall into two categories: carbon dioxide
removal and solar radiation management.30 Carbon dioxide removal, as its
name implies, is the practice of removing carbon dioxide (“CO2”) from the atmosphere.31 Essentially, geoengineers want to remove CO2 because it heats the
planet.32 When sunlight hits Earth, Earth reflects the heat energy from the sunlight back into space.33 CO2, however, absorbs the heat energy and then rereleases some of it back into the atmosphere.34 Hence, CO2 in the atmosphere
heats up the planet, and the removal of CO2 will cool the Earth’s temperatures.35
CO2 removal is an attractive option because of the high costs and politics
involved with requiring large CO2 emitters, such as coal plants, to filter their
CO2. Without having to use potentially dangerous geoengineering techniques,
there are already “basic ways in which engineers could alter existing coal plants
to grab their carbon dioxide.”36 One of the main non-geoengineering techniques
for reducing CO2 is for coal plants to replace their air supply with pure oxygen
in the boiler.37 Although this technique makes the CO2 easier to “grab,” it requires a large amount of energy and could cut “the efficiency of the coal plant
by 36 percent.”38 Alternatively, if coal plants added a CO2 filter to their exhaust, it could be very effective.39 However, CO2 filters are expensive, with an
estimation of a fifty to seventy dollar-per-ton increase of CO2 that is filtered.40
Although some countries may have the political willingness to adopt such an
expensive program, the largest CO2 emitters, such as China, the United States,
29

Id. at 14.
BRACMORT & LATTANZIO, supra note 15, at 2. For more information regarding geoengineering techniques, see IPCC, supra note 8; ROYAL SOC’Y, supra note 8, at 1.
31
BRACMORT & LATTANZIO, supra note 15, at 2.
32
How Does Carbon Dioxide Cause Global Warming, LANSING ST. J. (Aug. 31, 1994),
http://www.pa.msu.edu/sciencet/ask_st/083194.html.
33
Id.
34
Id.
35
BRACMORT & LATTANZIO, supra note 15, at 10.
36
KINTISCH, supra note 23, at 110.
37
Id.
38
Id.
39
Id.
40
Id. (citing an MIT study that estimated the costs of adding filters to coal plants); see David Biello, Can Captured Carbon Save Coal-Fired Power?, SCI. AM. (May 17, 2009),
http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/can-captured-carbon-save/ (stating that the use of
a $100 million carbon capture and sequestration boiler at a power plant produces nine metric
tons of CO2 per hour, but recognizing that CO2 can be compressed into liquid form and sold
to other companies, such as carbonated beverage makers like Coca-Cola).
30
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and India, would be unlikely to require such pricy business practices to save the
environment.41 Consequently, geoengineering techniques become a viable option when large, polluting companies are unwilling to foot the bill themselves.
Even if large CO2 emitters filtered their CO2, carbon dioxide removal may
still be necessary to cool the planet. Although carbon dioxide removal has not
been scientifically proven as safe and effective, it is proposed as an emergency
relief measure to prevent abrupt and severe climate change. Though the thought
of going green and reducing CO2 to save the planet is appealing, “[e]ven if we
cut CO2 pollution to zero tomorrow, the amount of CO2 we have already
pumped into the atmosphere will ensure that the climate will remain warm for
centuries.”42 In fact, CO2 can remain in the atmosphere for up to 100,000
years.43 Thus, carbon dioxide removal has gained some popularity as a proposed application of geoengineering.
The other main geoengineering experiment—solar radiation management—is also a widely controversial subject. During the second of three congressional hearings on geoengineering in the House of Representatives’ Committee on Science and Technology in February of 2010, expert witness Dr.
Philip Rasch defined solar radiation management as the process of “managing
the amount of sunlight reaching the Earth’s surface.”44 The purpose of solar radiation management is to reduce some of the global warming that is expected
from the increasing amount of greenhouse gas concentrations.45 However, solar
radiation management will not be able to fix other problems related to the increasing amount of CO2, such as the heightened acidity of the ocean, endangering marine life.46
One particularly contentious geoengineering technique, which would fall
under the category of solar radiation management, is the use of stratospheric
sulfate aerosols. This method is based on the logic that when a volcano erupts,
it naturally cools down the earth because of the injection of sulfur dioxide into
the stratosphere.47 The man-made replicas of this natural phenomenon are
called sulfate aerosols, which “act like small reflectors that scatter sunlight.”48
Some of the sunlight hitting the aerosol drops gets scattered down toward Earth
41

KINTISCH, supra note 23, at 110. “ ‘CCS is advancing slowly, due to high costs and lack
of political and financial commitment.’ ” ‘Clean Coal’ Technologies, Carbon Capture & Sequestration, WORLD NUCLEAR ASS’N, http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/Energy-and-Envi
ronment/-Clean-Coal--Technologies/ (last updated Feb. 2015) (quoting the International Energy Association).
42
GOODELL, supra note 1, at 9.
43
Id.
44
Geoengineering IIe: The Scientific Basis and Engineering Challenges: Hearing Before
the H. Comm. on Sci. & Tech., 111th Cong. 1 (2010) (statement of Dr. Philip Rasch, Scientist, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory).
45
BRACMORT & LATTANZIO, supra note 15, at 15.
46
GOODELL, supra note 1, at 17.
47
Geoengineering IIe, supra note 44, at 5.
48
Id.
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and some gets reflected back out of our atmosphere.49 Consequently, Earth
cools down.50 “[S]cientists [have] estimated that geoengineering the upper atmosphere with this particular technique could cool Earth by as much as 4 °F in
a few years.”51 Scientists have also proposed using the same method to adjust
climates to taste, whereby everyone could enjoy the same Mediterranean climate.52 However, this lavish proposal was quickly abandoned after realizing
that not all food supplies grow properly in a Mediterranean climate.53
C. Controversy in the Scientific Community
Although these proposed geoengineering strategies might theoretically help
counteract global warming, many respected, mainstream scientists have expressed doubt over the safety and effectiveness of geoengineering.54 For example, Michael Oppenheimer, a climate scientist at Princeton, stated: “ ‘The fact
that we’re even talking about it is a sign of desperation.’ ”55 Further, John
Holdren, Chief Science Advisor to President Barack Obama, opined: “ ‘The geoengineering approaches considered so far appear to be afflicted with some
combination of high costs, low leverage, and a high likelihood of serious side
effects.’ ”56
In general, scientists’ doubts about geoengineering can be summed up in
three main arguments.57 First, many experts believe that “we are messing with a
system we don’t understand.”58 Earth’s climate is much more complex than we
think. Scientists may understand the theories behind geoengineering, but the
consequences are not always foreseeable. A prime example is the Beijing blizzard.59 Chinese scientists may have understood the theory of cloud seeding; yet,
they did not expect to create an uncontrollable blizzard that killed over forty
people and caused more than $650 million of damage.60 Moreover, the Beijing
blizzard was a simple case of cloud seeding—a localized, small-scale weather
modification technique. If scientists cannot fully understand cloud seeding,
49

Id.
Id.
51
KINTISCH, supra note 23, at 7.
52
Id.
53
Id.
54
GOODELL, supra note 1, at 13.
55
Id.
56
Id.
57
Id. at 18.
58
Id.; Climate Change FAQ, SCRIPPS INST. OF OCEANOGRAPHY, http://aquarium.ucsd.edu
/climate/Climate_Change_FAQ/ (last visited May 27, 2015) (“[W]e don’t yet fully understand the behavior of Earth’s complex climate system.”).
59
Dean, supra note 2. But see GOODELL, supra note 1, at 41 (“The fact that even the best
models can’t accurately predict next week’s weather is evidence of just how dynamic the
system is. . . . ‘Predicting weather and predicting climate are two different things. A system
can be quite chaotic on a local or regional level, while much steadier on a global scale.’ ”).
60
Dean, supra note 2.
50
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how can we have the confidence to let them manipulate the climate of an entire
hemisphere, with the potential to cause catastrophic results that span not just
countries, but continents?
Second, the mere fact of discussing geoengineering “distracts us from the
urgent job of cutting greenhouse gas pollution.”61 The sad reality is that the
world—particularly the United States—is having trouble going green.62 In fact,
CO2 emissions in the United States for 2013 actually increased due to higher
costs of natural gas, “which prompted some utilities to switch back to a dirtier
energy source—coal.”63 The United States is the second-worst country for CO2
emissions, but it is nipping at China’s heels.64 Unfortunately, the United States
and many other highly developed countries seem unlikely to reverse the trend
anytime soon:
[I]f people believe there is a quick technological fix out there for global warming, they will ask why we should bother going through all the pain and struggle
of reinventing the world’s energy systems. After all, who wants to pay higher
electric bills, move to a smaller house, or give up their third TV if we can just
throw some dust in the air and cool off the planet? This is a version of the classic
“moral hazard” argument that economists use frequently to underscore why
flood insurance encourages people to build homes in flood-prone locations, or
why bank bailouts discourage investment firms from instituting real reforms. If
someone else is going to cover the loss, it greatly lessens the urgency of taking
responsibility for one’s own actions.65

This moral hazard leads to the third argument against geoengineering, that
it is “evidence of exactly the same kind of industrial thinking that cooked the
planet in the first place.”66 The root problem is that “Western civilization as we
know it is unsustainable.”67 The climatic footprint that an average family
makes, with their SUVs, multiple TVs, and endless energy consumption, cannot be balanced out by recycling a few soda cans here and there. Hence, our
lavish lifestyle “compels us to chase after a technological fix—a high-tech
Band-Aid that will solve all our problems.”68
Through a legal lens, geoengineering raises another shadow of doubt regarding accountability. Even if the international legal arena adopts a geoengineering treaty, how can one prove that a particular type of weather at a particular time was geoengineered? The problem is that modern science will allow us
to engage in geoengineering, but not necessarily to measure its true impact:
61

GOODELL, supra note 1, at 19.
Sarah Wolfe, Dirty Deeds: The World’s Biggest Polluters by Country, GLOBALPOST (Jan.
14, 2014, 3:35 PM), http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/science/global-warming
/140113/dirty-deeds-the-worlds-biggest-polluters-co2-emissions-country.
63
Id.
64
Id.
65
GOODELL, supra note 1, at 19–20.
66
Id. at 20.
67
Id. at 21.
68
Id.
62
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If we take an active role in managing the planet, we will replace mystery and
beauty with lousy engineering. If it rains too little, we will curse the engineers at
Climate Control Center. If it rains too much, we will curse them again. Once in a
while, they will get it right, and once in a while, we will be grateful.69

It is not difficult to see, then, how the floodgates of litigation might consequently be flung open. For example, people may start suing their governments
regardless of whether geoengineering is actually responsible for certain changes in the weather: some may sue because the fog from sulfate aerosols depresses them; some may sue because their plants are not growing properly; and some
may sue because the fog blocked their million-dollar ocean view. Regardless of
the reason, if people believe the government is affecting the weather, then they
may also believe the government is to blame whenever something goes wrong.
Because it is not clear how to distinguish between geoengineered weather and
naturally-occurring weather,70 society’s already underfunded judicial resources
would be consumed by weather-related lawsuits.
Therefore, with these arguments in mind, and to ensure the safety and effectiveness of geoengineering practices, it is essential to establish a legal
framework that provides sufficient legal accountability in the unfortunate event
of a geoengineered catastrophe.
II. RESEARCH FINDINGS—CASE STUDIES
In order to answer the important research question—how can international
law provide sufficient legal accountability in case of a catastrophic accident
from geoengineering—this note uses four different case studies as the form of
analysis. Due to the lack of international law regarding the specific issue of accountability for geoengineering practices, this note examines different bodies of
international law and U.S. environmental practices in order to determine the
best comparative framework for this narrow question.71 Even though they are
distinct bodies of international law, the legal frameworks for arms control, intellectual property rights, and environmental law all have features applicable to
an international agreement that could be used as a legal framework for geoengineering accountability.
For each of the four case studies, this note briefly discusses the basic principles of each international agreement or U.S. federal statute, before specifically focusing on the issue of accountability, regulation, and enforceability. For
the first case study, in the field of arms control, this note investigates ENMOD
69

Id. at 218.
See infra Part II(B) (discussing the use of environmental impact assessments as a presumption of liability).
71
Examining different fields of law is a recommended practice for geoengineering due to
the lack of applicable international law. See IPCC, supra note 8, at 34. (“[Geoengineering]
relies on the flexible adaptation, or possible amendment, of existing treaty rules or the application of customary international law rules, seeking to employ the legal tools at hand to
regulate geoengineering activities.”).
70

1070

NEVADA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 15:1060

to showcase the only current legal framework for environmental modification
techniques. Although ENMOD’s prevention of hostile or military uses of environmental modification techniques does not regulate the use of peaceful weather modification or geoengineering,72 the examination of ENMOD shows the
predicaments that the international arena faces when trying to create accountability for environmental modification techniques. The second case study, the
National Environmental Policy Act, requires certain environmental impact assessments when a federal undertaking may significantly impact the environment. This Act provides the framework for how a geoengineering treaty should
be regulated and how it can overcome the issue of proving environmental modification techniques actually caused the damaging weather or climate.
In the third case study, this note studies the Agreement on Trade Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (“TRIPS Agreement”) to analyze issues
of legal accountability in international law regarding intellectual property. The
TRIPS Agreement, administered by the World Trade Organization, offers dispute settlement strategies and levels of accountability for international violations of intellectual property rights. For the fourth case study, in the field of environmental law, the Montreal Protocol provides a legal framework for
governmental liability and enforcement. Although the Montreal Protocol is not
the most recent or relevant international agreement in global environmental
governance, it is the most successful case of international environmental implementation.73
A. Case Study: ENMOD
In order to explore the legal ramifications of ENMOD in the context of
weather modification, it is imperative to establish the series of events that led to
the creation of ENMOD. Hence, this section analyzes the history of weather
modification leading to ENMOD before evaluating its legal implications with
respect to weather modification and, possibly, geoengineering. As the only
piece of international law dealing with any type of weather modification,
ENMOD is the most relevant treaty to geoengineering.
Despite the fact that weather modification techniques were first officially
performed in 1946 in the United States,74 it was not until the Vietnam War ef72
Because of ENMOD’s broad definition of environmental modification techniques, if geoengineering was used for hostile or military purposes, ENMOD may certainly be applicable. However, the definition of geoengineering—the large-scale manipulation of the Earth’s
climate to counteract global warming—makes clear that geoengineering is solely used for
peaceful purposes. See ROYAL SOC’Y, supra note 8. If geoengineering was used for military
or other hostile uses, it would not be considered geoengineering. Instead, it simply would be
the large-scale manipulation of the Earth’s climate for military and/or hostile purposes.
Hence, the term geoengineering signifies that peaceful purposes are intended, which would
eliminate ENMOD’s applicability.
73
Donald Kaniaru et al., Strengthening the Montreal Protocol: Insurance Against Abrupt
Climate Change, 7 SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POL’Y 3, 4 (2007).
74
GOODELL, supra note 1, at 171–72.
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fort that this new science received international recognition. The Department of
Defense (“DOD”) finally had to admit to its use of cloud seeding in North Vietnam from 1967–1972.75 The Senate, as directed by Senator Claiborne Pell,
then held a hearing regarding the United States’ use of weather modification for
military purposes.76 Colonel Ed Soyster, Chief Advisor to the committee hearing, explained that he, and many notable scientists, believed that cloud seeding
was an acceptable tactic to use in warfare because it (supposedly) has no harmful effects to civilians.77 He exemplified this belief by saying: “It is the consensus of the scientific community that the techniques employed could not be used
to create large uncontrolled storm systems accidentally or purposely.”78 During
that same Congressional hearing, the DOD admitted to using cloud-seeding
techniques in Vietnam for a period of about six years; however, the DOD denied the allegation that the United States military was responsible for the devastating floods that North Vietnam faced in 1971, which caused expansive civilian suffering.79 A representative from the DOD claimed that those floods were
caused by natural rainfall.80
After Senator Pell, a strong advocate for banning weather modification,
publicized the secret rainmaking program that the United States was using in
North Vietnam, an international uproar began over the potential possibilities of
weather modification.81 Senator Pell led the Senate to vote for a resolution that
would urge the Administration to seek a treaty banning weather modification in
warfare.82 As Senator Pell explained, these environmental weather modification
techniques include, but are not limited to, melting polar ice, steering hurricanes,
and the inducement of rainfall, earthquakes, and tidal waves.83 As if the threat
of Mother Nature as a weapon is not frightening enough, the United States had
to worry about this science getting into the hands of a state actor with bad intentions or a lack of knowledge about the potential consequences of weather
modification.

75

Briefing on Dep’t of Defense Weather Modification Activity: Hearing on Weather Modification Before the Subcomm. on Oceans & Int’l Env’t of the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations,
93rd Cong. 88 (1974).
76
Id. at 87.
77
Id. at 87, 92–93.
78
Id. at 93. Colonel Soyster explained that cloud seeding techniques were not overused;
once they achieved the result they desired, they would shift locations. Id. Also, Soyster stated that cloud seeding was not used during tropical rainstorms or when large amounts of rainfall already existed. Id.
79
Id. at 118.
80
Id.
81
See Bernard Gwertzman, A U.S.-Soviet Ban on Weather Use for War Is Near, N.Y. TIMES,
June 24, 1975, at 1.
82
Id. at 1, 7 (stating that when a resolution was brought to the Senate to urge the administration to ban weather modification techniques in warfare, it overwhelmingly passed 82–10).
83
Id. at 7.
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During this same era, the United States was in a cold war with Russia.84
This context further fueled the fear that weather modification techniques were
being developed for use against the United States. However, after the Soviet
Communist Party Leader, Leonid Brezhnev, met with Senator Pell on his trip to
Washington, D.C., he realized the possible hazards of the issue and later met
with President Nixon to draft an agreement on banning weather modification
techniques in warfare.85 In their negotiations, the two leaders said that in an effort to “limit the potential danger to mankind from possible new means of warfare,” they decided the possibilities of an environmental warfare ban should be
explored.86 They also stated that weather modification might have “widespread,
long-lasting, and severe effects harmful to human welfare,”87 words which later
became the basis for ENMOD. This similarity in language is due to the fact that
the Soviet Union called for this ban at the United Nations’ General Assembly
in 1976, which, as history has shown, led to ENMOD.88
The ambiguity of whether rain—in general—was induced by cloud seeding
was a contributing factor to the proposal of ENMOD. Even with the prohibition
of military or any other hostile use of environmental modification techniques,
there is still a question of how a state can be certain whether it is facing natural
or induced weather. If a nation may avoid repercussions merely be claiming it
had no part in weather modification, then the possibilities of weather modification being used as an untraceable weapon will increase.
Unfortunately, geoengineering, despite its catastrophic risks, is not currently considered to be a violation of ENMOD. As exemplified by its formal title—
the Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques—ENMOD clearly establishes that
weather modification can be practiced as long as it is not used as a weapon.89
Indeed, Article One provides that parties are only prohibited from using these
environmental techniques with “widespread, long-lasting or severe effects as
the means of destruction, damage or injury to any other State Party.”90
Scholar Lawrence Juda addresses the ambiguities and loopholes caused by
including the threshold requirement that weather modification techniques are

84

See generally Quintard Taylor, Jr., United States History: Timeline: Cold War, U. WASH.
DEP’T HIST., http://faculty.washington.edu/qtaylor/a_us_history/cold_war_timeline.htm (last
visited May 27, 2015) (stating that the Cold War lasted from 1945 to 1991).
85
Gwertzman, supra note 81, at 1, 7.
86
Id. at 1.
87
Id.
88
Id. For a history of the negotiations leading to ENMOD, see Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques—
Narrative, U.S. DEP’T ST., http://www.state.gov/t/isn/4783.htm (last visited May 27, 2015).
89
See ENMOD, supra note 13.
90
Id. at art. I (emphasis added).
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only prohibited if they have “widespread, long-lasting or severe effects.”91
State actors, as Juda explains, have the ability to use environmental modification techniques for hostile or military purposes as long as they do not meet the
above criteria.92 Furthermore, Juda argues that the incorporation of the term
“hostile use” in Article One was “questioned since damage to other states could
result from the attempt to modify the environment for peaceful purposes such
as through programs of precipitation enhancement.”93 Consequently, Juda asks:
“How is ‘hostile’ intent to be established?”94 This question is still a matter of
controversy, and it will surely be debated during the negotiation of any international agreement for geoengineering, especially regarding accountability for
geoengineered catastrophes.
Although ENMOD addresses the potential risks of environmental modification techniques to human welfare, it still grants absolute freedom and provides zero regulation for the use of such techniques for peaceful purposes.95 As
stated in Article Three, a state has the right to participate in and facilitate, to the
fullest possible extent, the science of environmental modification in accordance
with international law.96 One important aspect of Article Three is its explanation that environmental modification can be used for peaceful purposes with the
intent of “preservation, improvement and peaceful utilization of the environment, with due consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the
world.”97 With the latter in mind, consider another example of China’s use of
weather modification—rain prevention to make the weather more convenient
during the 2008 Beijing Olympics.98 It would be difficult to argue that China’s
use of weather modification for the Olympics was done with the intent to preserve or improve the environment.99 Hence, China’s practice of altering the
climate was simply used as a tool for convenience, economics, and reputation,
which arguably are not permissible purposes covered by ENMOD.
91
Lawrence Juda, Negotiating a Treaty on Environmental Modification Warfare: The Convention on Environmental Warfare and Its Impact upon Arms Control Negotiations, 32 INT’L
ORG. 975, 980 (1978).
92
Id.
93
Id.
94
Id.
95
See ENMOD, supra note 13, at art. III(1).
96
Id. at art. III(2).
97
Id. A question not addressed by ENMOD is the use of weather modification for recreational purposes and convenience, such as the Chinese did in the Beijing blizzard tragedy, to
make farming possible during the drought, or the 2008 Beijing Olympics.
98
Yu Zheng, Beijing Uses High-Tech to Prevent Rain from Dampening Olympic Opening,
CHINA VIEW (July 28, 2008, 1:20 PM), http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2008-07/28
/content_8787101.htm (stating that in an effort to save the opening Olympic ceremony from
rainfall, the Beijing Weather Engineering Office used satellite monitoring and cloud seeding); see also Barbara Demick, China Plans to Halt Rain for Olympics, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 31,
2008, at A3.
99
See generally Yu Zheng, supra note 98 (stating that Beijing used cloud seeding to prevent
rain during the Olympic opening).
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Article Two of ENMOD defines the term “environmental modification
techniques” to include the following: “[A]ny technique for changing—through
the deliberate manipulation of natural processes—the dynamics, composition or
structure of the Earth, including its biota, lithosphere, hydrosphere and atmosphere, or of outer space.”100 Although this definition may encompass geoengineering techniques, at least in a legal and technical sense, ENMOD does not
incorporate any legal framework for the issue of accountability in cases of environmental modification catastrophes, nor does it regulate the use of environmental modification techniques for peaceful purposes. Article Five of ENMOD
describes the only part of the treaty regarding breach. Article Five states: “Any
State Party to this Convention which has reason to believe that any other State
Party is acting in breach of obligations deriving from the provisions of the
Convention may lodge a complaint with the Security Council of the United Nations.”101 Furthermore, Article Five explains that the Security Council will investigate such a complaint.102 However, ENMOD does not specifically mention
the examination of intent—whether for hostile and military purposes or peaceful purposes—and it similarly does not address accountability. Consequently,
ENMOD is insufficient to provide the framework for legal accountability in
cases of geoengineered catastrophes.
ENMOD does not regulate the use of environmental modification techniques for peaceful purposes. Instead, ENMOD simply states it does not “hinder the use of environmental modification techniques for peaceful purposes.”103
By not hindering its use, while also not regulating it, state actors can practice
“peaceful” environmental modification techniques in compliance with
ENMOD, but without any oversight. It is, therefore, necessary to look at other
areas of international law to develop a legal framework for the issues of accountability, regulation, and enforcement.
B. Case Study: National Environmental Policy Act
The Environmental Protection Agency, a U.S. federal agency, oversees the
enforcement of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (“NEPA”)
through the Council on Environmental Quality.104 NEPA “requires federal
agencies to integrate environmental values into their decision making processes
by considering the environmental impacts of their proposed actions and reasonable alternatives to those actions.”105 To comply with NEPA, federal agencies
100

ENMOD, supra note 13, at art. II.
Id. at art. V(3).
102
Id. at art. V(4).
103
Id. at art. III(1).
104
42 U.S.C. § 4321 (2012); National Environmental Policy Act: Basic Information, U.S.
ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY (last updated May 4, 2015), http://www.epa.gov/compliance
/basics/nepa.html [hereinafter NEPA: Basic Information].
105
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY (last updated Feb. 3, 2015), http://www.epa.gov/compliance/nepa/.
101

Spring 2015]

GEOENGINEERING

1075

are required to “prepare detailed statements assessing the environmental impact
of and alternatives to major federal actions significantly affecting the environment,” which are commonly referred to as environmental impact statements.106
Environmental impact statements must be made available to the public before
any action is taken or any decisions are made.107 Further, NEPA states that the
purpose of the environmental impact statements is to provide high quality information that is central to the action in question and is based on “[a]ccurate
scientific analysis, expert agency comments, and public scrutiny.”108
The NEPA process—used to evaluate the potential environmental effects
of a federal undertaking, along with its alternatives—has three levels of analysis: (1) categorical exclusions; (2) environmental assessments; and (3) environmental impact statements.109 First, categorical exclusions, as its name implies, allows federal agencies to avoid the research and preparation of
environmental assessments or environmental impact statements for certain undertakings.110 If the Council on Environmental Quality already has determined
that a particular undertaking does not have significant environmental impact, it
serves as a precedent for federal agencies to determine that it is normally excluded from environmental evaluation under NEPA.111
The second and third levels of scrutiny under NEPA require research, thorough analysis, and written assessments to determine whether an environmental
impact exists. Regarding environmental assessments, a federal agency is required to submit a written proposal that includes the following: “[t]he need for
the proposal; [a]lternatives (when there is an unresolved conflict concerning
alternative uses of available resources); [t]he environmental impacts of the proposed action and alternatives; [and a] listing of agencies and persons consulted.”112 The purpose of the environmental assessment is to “determine whether
or not a federal undertaking would significantly affect the environment.”113 If
the proposed federal undertaking would not significantly affect the environment, the agency shall prepare a “finding of no significant impact.”114
106

NEPA: Basic Information, supra note 104; see also 42 U.S.C. § 4332.
40 C.F.R. § 1500.1(b) (2014).
108
Id.; see also id. § 1502.1 (“[Environmental impact statements] shall provide full and fair
discussion of significant environmental impacts and shall inform decisionmakers and the
public of the reasonable alternatives which would avoid or minimize adverse impacts or enhance the quality of the human environment. Agencies shall focus on significant environmental issues and alternatives and shall reduce paperwork and the accumulation of extraneous background data. Statements shall be concise, clear, and to the point, and shall be
supported by evidence that the agency has made the necessary environmental analyses.”).
109
NEPA: Basic Information, supra note 104.
110
Id.
111
Id. For examples of federal undertakings that are categorically excluded by statute, see
23 C.F.R. § 771.117(c) (2014) (excluding undertakings, such as landscaping and the construction of pedestrian and bicycle lanes, paths, and facilities).
112
NEPA: Basic Information, supra note 104; see also 40 C.F.R. § 1508.9(b).
113
NEPA: Basic Information, supra note 104 (emphasis added).
114
Id.
107
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On the other hand, if an environmental assessment determines that the federal undertaking would significantly affect the environment, the federal agency
must prepare an environmental impact statement, which is the third level of
analysis under NEPA.115 Compared to the environmental assessment, an environmental impact statement is more detailed in relation to the proposed undertaking and possible alternatives.116 An environmental impact statement includes: “[d]iscussions of the purpose of and need for the action; [a]lternatives;
[t]he affected environment; [t]he environmental consequences of the proposed
action; [l]ists of preparers, agencies, organizations and persons to whom the
statement is sent; [a]n index; [and an] appendix (if any).”117
One of the main benefits about the NEPA process is the transparency for
the public. The NEPA process allows the public to comment on an agency’s
NEPA documents, attend hearings or public meetings, and submit comments
directly to the federal agency.118 Congress declared that one of the purposes of
NEPA is to “encourage productive and enjoyable harmony between man and
his environment; . . . [and] to enrich the understanding of the ecological systems and natural resources important to the Nation.”119 To achieve this connection between man and his environment, man must be allowed to play an active
role in undertakings that may significantly impact the environment.
Environmental impact statements and assessments (collectively referred to
as “Environmental Impact Assessments”) provide many benefits to the agency
or developer.120 In addition to Environmental Impact Assessments demonstrating due diligence to defend against a claim of negligence, Environmental Impact Assessments also “can lead to more environmentally sensitive development; to improved relations between the developer, the planning authority and
the local communities; [and] to a smoother development consent process.”121
The NEPA process provides an applicable framework to a geoengineering
treaty. Adopting the NEPA process would solve several issues. First, requiring
Environmental Impact Assessments would regulate environmental modification
techniques. Like the Environmental Protection Agency has the Council on Environmental Quality, an international body could be established to regulate the
115

40 C.F.R. § 1501.4; NEPA: Basic Information, supra note 104. If an agency anticipates
that its undertaking will significantly impact the environment, the agency can skip level
two—filing an environmental assessment—and file an environmental impact statement. Id.
116
NEPA: Basic Information, supra note 104.
117
Id.
118
Id.; Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) Database, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY
(last updated Feb. 3, 2015), http://www.epa.gov/compliance/nepa/eisdata.html (“All EISs are
filed with EPA, and EPA publishes a ‘Notice of Availability’ each week in the Federal Register. The ‘Notice of Availability’ is the start of the 45-day public comment period for Draft
EISs. This notice is also the start of the 30-day ‘wait period’ for Final EISs, in which agencies are generally required to wait 30 days before making a decision on a proposed action.”).
119
42 U.S.C. § 4321 (2012).
120
JOHN GLASSON ET AL., INTRODUCTION TO ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT 7 (4th
ed., 2012).
121
Id.
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Environmental Impact Assessments. This note will refer to such potential international agency as CENMOD,122 which would have current information on all
proposed and practiced geoengineering or weather modification techniques.
Further, by adopting the three-tiered level of analysis for environmental modification undertakings, CENMOD could categorically exclude certain types of
small-scale environmental modification techniques. For example, scientists
could determine a safe and effective amount of silver iodide to disperse among
clouds per square mile. If farmers desired to cloud seed their own land, there
would be no need to go through the Environmental Impact Assessments as long
as the proposal fell within a certain threshold category. On the other hand, a
country could skip the second tier of the analysis and issue an environmental
impact statement if it knew that its proposal would have a significant impact on
the environment, just like federal agencies do under NEPA.123
Regulation of environmental modification techniques—geoengineering and
weather modification—is imperative to ensure the health of the environment.
By requiring state actors to submit Environmental Impact Assessments,
CENMOD, using a panel of experts, could oversee the frequency of environmental modification techniques. Due to the underdeveloped nature of geoengineering, the long-term effects of proposed geoengineering techniques on the
environment, such as using sulfate aerosols, is unclear. CENMOD could establish regulations to ensure that state actors were not damaging the health of the
environment, the eco-systems, or the world’s population.124
Also, the requirement that Environmental Impact Assessments be published for the public should be incorporated into a geoengineering treaty.125 For
example, if the United States wanted to practice geoengineering, its environmental impact statement may include the possible impact on neighboring countries, such as Canada and Mexico. The United States would submit its report to
CENMOD to ensure that it would be publicly available to all countries.
A further issue that the NEPA process would help solve is the issue of
proving whether a state actor using environmental modification techniques
caused any particular climatic effect. One of the largest hurdles in a geoengineering treaty is the ability for a state actor to prove that the damage it suffered
from some type of weather or climate change is the result of another state actor’s use of geoengineering or weather modification, instead of simply Mother

122

Following the popular acronym of “ENMOD,” I propose that this international governing
body be nicknamed: “CENMOD”—Council on Environmental Modification.
123
NEPA: Basic Information, supra note 104.
124
For example, if a state actor decided to use sulfate aerosols to cool itself down,
CENMOD may have regulations on the use of the sulfate aerosols: how high must the aerosols be dispersed to avoid it affecting the environment below; what measurement of sulfate
aerosols is safe; how often can sulfate aerosols be dispersed; can every state actor simultaneously disperse sulfate aerosols or do state actors need to take turns?
125
NEPA: Basic Information, supra note 104.
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Nature.126 Environmental Impact Assessments can help solve that issue because
they would provide for a public record of a state actor’s use of environmental
modification techniques. If a state actor encountered an unusual weather or
climate pattern that caused damage, such as the Beijing blizzard, it could investigate Environmental Impact Assessments filed with CENMOD. The damaged
state actor could then use the Environmental Impact Assessments as a presumption of liability in a dispute settlement mechanism. Therefore, the adoption of
the NEPA process not only provides for safer environmental practices, but also
the requirement of state actors submitting Environmental Impact Assessments
as a form of regulation would facilitate CENMOD to provide sufficient legal
accountability in cases of catastrophe or damage.
C. Case Study: TRIPS Agreement
The Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights,
referred to as the TRIPS Agreement, is an international agreement administered
by the World Trade Organization (“WTO”).127 This Agreement deals with the
minimum standards for many forms of intellectual property regulations for
WTO member states.128 Due to its strict regulations and the creation of the Dispute Settlement Body,129 the TRIPS Agreement provides an example of the
possible legal framework for an international geoengineering agreement. Furthermore, the TRIPS Agreement incorporates a strictly enforced framework for
accountability from violations of intellectual property rights.130 In order to
showcase the applicability of the TRIPS Agreement to a potential geoengineering agreement, this section first examines key articles of the TRIPS Agreement,
while detailing the process of the Dispute Settlement Body.
The TRIPS Agreement was negotiated at the end of the Uruguay Round of
the General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade (“GATT”) in 1994.131 GATT became the basis for the establishment of the World Trade Organization.132 The
TRIPS Agreement is a compulsory requirement of WTO membership.133 Con126
Scientists ‘Cause’ Beijing Snow, supra note 5 (“Even if it is theoretically possible, one of
the problems for proponents has been to demonstrate that a rainfall or snowfall was caused
by the seeding or simply occurred spontaneously.”).
127
See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 1869
U.N.T.S. 299, 300 [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement].
128
Id.
129
Id. at art. 64.
130
See id. at art. 41.
131
Understanding the WTO: The Agreements, WORLD TRADE ORG., http://www.wto.org
/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/agrm7_e.htm (last visited May 27, 2015).
132
Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Hard and Soft Law in International Governance,
54 INT’L ORG. 421, 436 (2000) (“Over time, GATT developed into the WTO as states
learned the advantages of harder legalization in governing international trade.”).
133
TRIPS Agreement, supra note 127, at art. 1(1). Article 1 requires WTO members to
“give effect to the provisions of this Agreement.” Id.
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sequently, countries that seek to acquire easy access to the international markets through the WTO must ratify the strict intellectual property laws mandated
by TRIPS. The TRIPS Agreement created the Dispute Settlement Body that the
member governments must use when a dispute arises.134 Prior to the Dispute
Settlement Body, international intellectual property law “did not provide any
practical means of recourse, at the multilateral level, to a government that believed that another government was not living up to its obligations.”135
A dispute occurs “when a member government believes another member
government is violating a WTO agreement. The complaining member must
submit a ‘request for consultations’ identifying the agreements it believes are
being violated.”136 The first stage of the Dispute Settlement Body process is the
consultation stage.137 The consultation stage is an alternative dispute resolution
process that allows up to sixty days for the countries to settle the claim—either
on their own or in mediation with the WTO director-general.138 If the consultations are unsuccessful, the “complaining country can ask for a panel to be appointed.”139 Once a request for a panel is filed, it can take up to forty-five days
for the Dispute Settlement Body to appoint a panel, and up to six months for
the panel to issue its report.140
The panel stage consists of written arguments, oral arguments, and preliminary reports between the countries and the panel.141 The first requirement in
the panel stage involves each country with an interest in the dispute “present[ing] its case in writing to the panel.”142 Then, the panel will hold its first
hearing, in which each interested country will argue its case.143 After having the
opportunity to hear each country’s arguments, the countries may “submit written rebuttals and present oral arguments at the panel’s second meeting.”144 If
one country’s case involves “scientific or other technical matters, the panel may
134

Id. at art. 64(1). The Dispute Settlement Body is “[m]ade up of all member governments,
usually represented by ambassadors or equivalent.” Dispute Settlement, WORLD TRADE ORG.,
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_e.htm (last visited May 27, 2015).
135
Matthijs Geuze & Hannu Wager, WTO Dispute Settlement Practice Relating to the
TRIPS Agreement, 2 J. INT’L ECON. L. 347, 347 (1999).
136
Dispute Settlement: The Disputes, WORLD TRADE ORG., http://www.wto.org/english
/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_agreements_index_e.htm?id=A26 (last visited May 27, 2015).
137
Understanding
the
WTO:
Settling
Disputes,
WORLD
TRADE
ORG.,
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/disp1_e.htm (last visited May 27,
2015).
138
Id.
139
Id. The Dispute Settlement Body, at its discretion, may establish a panel, which “help[s]
the Dispute Settlement Body make rulings or recommendations.” Id. However, the Dispute
Settlement Body can accept the panel’s report, or reject it with a consensus of the Dispute
Settlement Body. Id. “Panels consist of three (possibly five) experts from different countries
who examine the evidence and decide who is right and who is wrong.” Id.
140
Id. The responding country is allowed to block the creation of the panel one time. Id.
141
Id.
142
Id.
143
Id.
144
Id.
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consult experts or appoint an expert review group to prepare an advisory report.”145 The panel then submits drafts and interim reports of the facts and arguments involved, along with its findings and conclusions.146 Each country in
the dispute has an opportunity to review the drafts, interim reports, and final
report; if necessary, the panel can hold additional meetings with the interested
countries.147 Once the panel releases its final report to all WTO members, it becomes a “ruling” of the Dispute Settlement Body within sixty days, unless a
consensus of the Dispute Settlement Body rejects the panel’s final report.148
The “Dispute Settlement Body is available as an ultimate arbiter.”149 In
cases of damages done to the rightful intellectual property holder, the WTO has
the judicial authority to order the infringer to pay adequate compensation and
expenses, which may include attorney’s fees.150 This compensation can also
apply retrospectively to the damages incurred during unintentional infringement.151 The infringing country must follow the recommendations of the panel’s report. If it cannot comply, it must state its intention to the Dispute Settlement Body and explain any reasons of impracticability or needing a longer
period of time to comply. If this occurs, then the complaining country can request permission from the Disputed Settlement Body to retaliate.152 Among
other things, retaliation can involve “suspend[ing] concessions or other obligations” and/or raising import duties.153
The TRIPS Agreement provides the international arena with an efficient
legal framework that encompasses the issue of accountability for violations.
This framework can be analogously applied to geoengineering and its potential
for catastrophe. Similar to the TRIPS Agreement’s use of the WTO’s Dispute
Settlement Body, international disputes regarding geoengineering may call for
some sort of dispute settlement body within CENMOD. To be useful, it would
need to be strict and have greater enforcement power than a mere complaint
and investigation system.
The Dispute Settlement Body’s process will be beneficial for a geoengineering treaty because of its alternative dispute resolution requirement154 and
145

Id.
Id.
147
Id.
148
Id.
149
Webster D. McBride, GI Joe? Coffee, Location, and Regulatory Accountability, 85
N.Y.U. L. REV. 2138, 2158 (2010).
150
TRIPS Agreement, supra note 127, at art. 45.
151
Id.
152
Understanding the WTO, supra note 137.
153
Id. (“In principle, the retaliation should be in the same sector as the dispute. If this is not
practical or if it would not be effective, it can be in a different sector of the same agreement.
In turn, if this is not effective or practicable and if the circumstances are not serious enough,
the action can be taken under another agreement.”).
154
The alternative dispute resolution process of the “consultation” stage of the Dispute Settlement Body allows most claims to be settled without the use of panels. Geuze & Wager,
supra note 135, at 375 (“Most disputes about matters of compliance with the requirements of
146
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its use of panels and experts on issues of science and technology. Because geoengineering and all environmental modification techniques are difficult to
prove, a panel of three to five different experts—including geoengineers, climatologists, scientists, and lawyers—from different countries will allow for expertise that surpasses the typical judicial tribunal. Moreover, the continual exchange between arguments, drafts, interim reports, and final reports allows
countries to ensure that the panel correctly understands their arguments and the
science supporting them.
Although the TRIPS Agreement involves intellectual property, it provides
a great example of the structure that a geoengineering treaty may encompass.
The use of the Dispute Settlement Body is the most important tool for any potential geoengineering treaty because inquiry without any means for enforcement or repercussions will fail to produce any real results. By adding the principles of the TRIPS Agreement to ENMOD, ENMOD would progress toward
becoming a more appropriate international treaty to address the issue of accountability for geoengineered catastrophes.
D. Case Study: Montreal Protocol
The Montreal Protocol, officially known as the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, came into effect when signed on September 16, 1987.155 Although there are more recent or relevant international
agreements in global environmental governance,156 the Montreal Protocol is the
most successful case of international environmental implementation.157 Consequently, the Montreal Protocol—considered a historic event for a range of reasons158—offers two main elements that could be incorporated into a geoengineering treaty. First, it is the first treaty that adopted the “precautionary
approach,” meaning governments implement substantial measures for environmental protection before complete knowledge about the threat has been proven.159 Second, the Montreal Protocol is the first environmental treaty in which
state actors consensually incorporated a “formal noncompliance procedure.”160
This noncompliance procedure offers positive and negative incentives through
the TRIPS Agreement are resolved in bilateral consultations between the Members concerned, either in Geneva or in capitals, without invoking the dispute settlement procedures in
the [Dispute Settlement Body].”).
155
Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, Sept. 16, 1987, 1522
U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Montreal Protocol].
156
See generally Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change, Dec. 11, 1997, 2303 U.N.T.S. 162 (entered into force Feb. 16, 2005).
157
Kaniaru et al., supra note 73.
158
Shinya Murase et al., Compliance-Control in Respect of the Montreal Protocol, 89 AM.
SOC’Y INT’L L. 206, 206 (1995).
159
Id.; see also Brief Primer on the Montreal Protocol, UN ENV’T PROGRAMME,
http://ozone.unep.org/Publications/MP_Brief_Primer_on_MP-E.pdf (last visited May 27,
2015).
160
Murase et al., supra note 158.
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the use of the Multilateral Fund and trade restrictions, respectively. The Montreal Protocol’s precautionary principle and noncompliance procedure provide
another basis for an international treaty vis-à-vis legal accountability of geoengineering.
The precautionary principle is applicable “[w]hen human activities may
lead to morally unacceptable harm that is scientifically plausible but uncertain,
actions shall be taken to avoid or diminish that harm.”161 However, “a mere
fantasy or crude speculation that an activity or new technology causes harm is
not enough to trigger the [precautionary principle].”162 To recommend precautionary intervention, there must be judgments based on scientific analysis that
give rise to “reasonable grounds for concern.”163 Essentially, “this principle
says that, rather than await certainty, regulators should act in anticipation of
environmental harm to ensure that this harm does not occur.”164 The Montreal
Protocol acted in anticipation of the environmental damage from ozonedepleting substances because “[t]he science of ozone depletion was uncertain
when the Montreal Protocol was negotiated in 1987.”165
The Montreal Protocol’s noncompliance procedure has proven to be successful because it applies a combination of positive and negative incentives.166
First, the Montreal Protocol uses positive incentives through the use of the
Multilateral Fund.167 Second, the Montreal Protocol uses negative incentives
from the threat of trade restrictions to ensure compliance.168 Regarding the positive incentives, the noncompliance procedure has a dual standard for different
state actors depending on whether it is a wealthy, industrialized state or a developing country.169 The Montreal Protocol recognizes that the “commitments
of developing states are often contingent on their receipt of adequate resources
to fulfill those commitments.”170 Consequently, the noncompliance procedure
provides two resources to help developing nations: (1) a grace period for the
state actor to provide enough time to acquire the financial and technological resources to meet its obligations; and (2) a Multilateral Fund to which wealthier
161

WORLD COMM’N ON THE ETHICS OF SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE & TECH., U.N. EDUC.,
SCIENTIFIC & CULTURAL ORG., THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE 14 box 2 (2005).
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Id. at 50.
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Charles Weiss, Defining Precaution, 49 ENVIRONMENT 33, 34 (2007) (reviewing WORLD
COMM’N ON THE ETHICS OF SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE & TECH., U.N. EDUC., SCIENTIFIC &
CULTURAL ORG., THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE (2005)).
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Daniel Bodansky, Scientific Uncertainty and the Precautionary Principle, 33
ENVIRONMENT 4, 4 (1991).
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ECONOMIST (Apr. 17, 2003), http://www.economist.com/node/1715055.
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Scott Barrett & Robert Stavins, Increasing Participation and Compliance in International Climate Change Agreements, 3 INT’L ENVTL. AGREEMENTS: POL. L. & ECON. 349, 360–66
(2003) (discussing the positive and negative incentives of the Montreal Protocol).
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Id. at 361.
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Id. at 365.
169
See Montreal Protocol, supra note 155, at art. 5.
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states contribute to help developing nations to reduce their emissions.171 On the
other hand, industrialized nations must report to the Protocol Implementation
committee if they cannot meet their emission obligations.172 Otherwise, the
Montreal Protocol encourages whistleblowing on noncompliant states.173
Whether self-reported or reported by another party for noncompliance, the
implementation committee works with the noncompliant developing nation by
encouraging wealthier states to provide financial, technological, or other resources to achieve compliance through the Multilateral Fund.174 Hence, the industrialized countries pay the incremental costs of implementing the Montreal
Protocol. The Montreal Protocol did not just encourage countries to reduce
their own emissions, but it also encouraged industrialized countries to pay developing countries through the Multilateral Fund to reduce those countries’
emissions as well.175 Similar to the emission reductions, the contributions to the
Multilateral Fund are an obligation for certain state actors that have surpassed a
threshold level of consumption of ozone-depleting substances.176
Instead of solely using positive, financial incentives to increase compliance
with emission reductions, the Montreal Protocol used a credible threat of restricting trade regarding chlorofluorocarbons (“CFCs”), a known ozonedepleting substance, and products containing CFCs.177 Although trade has not
actually been restricted, the “belief that trade would be restricted if countries
failed to participate had the effect of promoting participation.”178 Negative incentives, such as trade restrictions, are justifiable for the Montreal Protocol:
The justification for using trade restrictions also depends on the perceived
fairness of an international treaty. No country could gain from ozone depletion,
and the countries that would gain the least from ozone protection—developing
countries—were compensated for participating in the Montreal Protocol. This
made the threat to impose restrictions appear to be fair.179

Although the damage caused by CFCs to the ozone layer has a detrimental
effect on the entire planet, several countries did not see any type of benefit, only economic difficulties, if they were to ratify the Montreal Protocol. Nevertheless, the incentives set forth by the Montreal Protocol, coupled with the non171
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http://www.multilateralfund.org/default.aspx (last visited May 27, 2015). Article 5 countries
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compliance procedures, have been successful.180 Specifically, the noncompliance procedure that threatens trade sanctions, while also providing community
support through the Multilateral Fund, has proven to be effective.181 Having
phased out almost one hundred ozone-depleting substances by nearly 100 percent in industrialized countries and at least 50–75 percent in developing countries, the Montreal Protocol is commonly considered one of the world’s most
successful multilateral environmental agreements.182 These statistics place the
ozone layer on a path to recovery later this century.183 The great success of the
Montreal Protocol can be attributed to the protocol’s “evolutionary process,”
which has been adjusted repeatedly over its “nearly twenty year history to reflect current developments in scientific understanding and technological capabilities.”184 To maintain the most efficient and contemporary environmental
treaty, as showcased by the Montreal Protocol’s success, it is imperative to continually adapt to the changes in science, technology, and the climate.
This evolutionary process, along with the pioneering efforts to enforce
compliance, make the Montreal Protocol a stellar example of the legal framework that could be adopted—at least partially—in an international geoengineering treaty. Adopted from the Montreal Protocol, the precautionary principle185 needs to be applied to geoengineering because it provides a cautious
approach to an underdeveloped technology with the potential for hemispheric
catastrophe. As the popular adage goes, “hope for the best, prepare for the
worst.” Essentially, the precautionary principle adopts an assumption into the
treaty that the worst possibility could develop when practicing geoengineering.
Similar to the Montreal Protocol, where the science of ozone depletion was uncertain during its negotiation, here, the science of geoengineering is also uncertain. Nevertheless, it does not follow that the potential liabilities of geoengineering catastrophes also need to be uncertain. Instead, state actors should have
a clear understanding of the potential risks and liabilities associated with practicing environmental modification techniques.
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Brief Primer on the Montreal Protocol, supra note 159 (“In 2009, the Montreal Protocol
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Atmospheric Pressure, supra note 165 (stating that “[t]he science of ozone depletion was
uncertain when the Montreal Protocol was negotiated in 1987”); see supra text accompanying notes 159–65.

Spring 2015]

GEOENGINEERING

1085

Just as the Montreal Protocol set up a Multilateral Fund to ensure compliance among developing states,186 a geoengineering treaty needs to set up a
comparable fund to maintain a balanced level of geoengineering practices between industrialized and developing nations. This fund would guarantee that
wealthier states, which can afford expensive geoengineering techniques, would
not be able to manipulate the climate to benefit them, while potentially worsening the climate in a developing country. For example, the shifting of a monsoon
to increase rainfall in an industrialized country may devastate the agricultural
practices of a developing country. Further, industrialized nations could subsidize the costs associated with the research and preparation of Environmental
Impact Assessments to ensure that developing countries are following the regulations of CENMOD and as a positive incentive to developing countries that
cannot afford the costs associated with the Environmental Impact Assessments.
Part of the reason that the Montreal Protocol has been so successful was its low
cost to all state actors.187 Therefore, a geoengineering treaty would need to ensure that the burden on state actors is relatively low, so that those who ratify the
treaty do not suffer as a consequence.
A geoengineering treaty would be beneficial to industrialized nations. Similar to the Montreal Protocol’s goal of recycling ozone-depleting substances—
which affect the atmosphere, thus affecting all state actors—geoengineering also has the ability to affect many state actors. Just as many state actors felt it
was necessary to ratify ENMOD188 to prevent environmental modification
techniques from being used as a weapon, state actors should ratify a geoengineering treaty to make sure that the treaty’s regulation, accountability, and enforcement would safeguard against negligent practices of environmental modification techniques. Even if a state actor has peaceful intentions, environmental
modification techniques used negligently could cause the same results as if
those techniques were used with hostile intentions. Consequently, it should be
the goal of all state actors to have an agreement that provides regulation, accountability, and enforcement in case of a geoengineering catastrophe.
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With the procedural mechanisms in place that allow a state to either self-report the state’s
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In order to adapt to the technological advances that will occur as time progresses, a geoengineering treaty should mimic the Montreal Protocol’s continual conventions and adjustments. This evolutionary process will not only make
the treaty continually fresh, but its constant conventions and adjustments will
serve as an enforcement reminder to state actors that the treaty still exists and
must be complied with. Moreover, Article 9 of the Montreal Protocol provides
for the “exchange of information,” which is used to help developing countries
with research, development, and public awareness.189 This concept of technology transfer may be implemented for geoengineering practices. If other countries
at least have the knowledge of the full capabilities of geoengineering, those
countries can make informed decisions in the international arena.
The Montreal Protocol provides an excellent example of enforcement for
an international environmental treaty. Combining these fundamental principles
from the Montreal Protocol to the foundation built from ENMOD with the proposed additions from the TRIPS Agreement and NEPA, a cohesive structure for
an international geoengineering treaty can be designed.
III. IMPLICATIONS
By incorporating the applicable elements from ENMOD, NEPA, the
TRIPS Agreement, and the Montreal Protocol, this note examines how a state
actor would be held accountable for a geoengineering catastrophe. Using the
Beijing blizzard calamity as a base hypothetical,190 but changing the location to
the country of Alpha, this note next analyzes how Beta—a neighboring country
to Alpha—would seek redress for the $650 million in damage and forty deaths
the Alpha blizzard caused from crossing into Beta.191
Under this note’s proposed geoengineering treaty (referred to in this section as “Treaty”), let’s rewind to Alpha’s decision to cloud seed. Assuming Alpha ratified the Treaty, the regulation requirements, taken from NEPA, would
mandate that Alpha determine whether cloud seeding would be categorically
excluded or would require an Environmental Impact Assessment. At this point,
CENMOD is a newly developed council and has not set any precedent for categorical exclusions. Therefore, Alpha would be required to submit an environmental assessment.192 This environmental assessment would need to include:
Alpha’s need for the proposal, which in this case would be its lingering
drought; any alternatives; the environmental impact of Alpha’s cloud seeding
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Montreal Protocol, supra note 155, at art. 9.
Although the Beijing blizzard was caused by cloud seeding—a form of weather modification—instead of geoengineering, it is one of the only environmental modification disasters
known to the public. This hypothetical provides a realistic idea of the issue of accountability
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192
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plan; and a list of agencies or persons consulted.193 In this environmental assessment, Alpha would include the dates of the proposed cloud seeding plan (in
this case, November 2009), the location, the amount of silver iodide involved,
and the method of disbursement. After research and preparation of its environmental assessment, Alpha determined that the proposed cloud seeding would
not significantly affect the environment. Consequently, it filed a “finding of no
significant impact” with CENMOD.194
CENMOD reviewed its Environmental Impact Assessments in that region
to determine that no other environmental modification practices would conflict
with Alpha’s proposed plan. CENMOD published the environmental assessment on its website—available to the public in September 2009.195 Starting in
November 2009, Alpha began its cloud seeding plan. It dispersed the predetermined amount of silver iodide into the clouds in an effort to produce
rain.196 However, Alpha’s continual disbursement of silver iodide, coupled with
existing weather patterns, led to a blizzard that crossed into the country of Beta.
The blizzard caused a total of $650 million in damage and killed forty Beta citizens.
The Beta Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment, aware of Alpha’s plan because of CENMOD’s publication, reviewed Alpha’s environmental assessment to determine whether there may be a link between the blizzard
and Alpha’s cloud seeding. Determined that Alpha was responsible for the
damage from the blizzard and the death of its citizens, Beta filed a “request for
consultations” with the Dispute Settlement Body of CENMOD. Within the sixty-day time period for consultations, the parties’ discussions were unproductive. The parties, therefore, requested the WTO director-general to serve as a
mediator for the parties. Nevertheless, the parties could not reach a settlement.197
The parties moved forward through the Dispute Settlement Body by requesting a panel. Within forty-five days, CENMOD’s Dispute Settlement Body
appointed a panel of five experts, comprised of scientists and lawyers. The experts were on a list of pre-qualified panelists from different countries, and Beta
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had an opportunity to block the appointment of any expert.198 Once
CENMOD’s Dispute Settlement Body finalized the panel, the parties submitted
written arguments supporting their positions. At the first hearing, Beta argued
that Alpha’s environmental assessment demonstrates its use of cloud seeding,
which should serve as a presumption of liability. Because of the timing and location of Alpha’s cloud seeding operation, the panel agreed with Beta regarding
a presumption of liability and shifted the burden of proof to Alpha to demonstrate that it is not liable for the damage its cloud seeding operation caused.
At the following hearings, Alpha presented expert reports on issues of causation and climatology. Nevertheless, the panel ruled in favor of Beta, awarding
it $500 million for the physical damage it sustained and as compensation to the
families of the victims. The Dispute Settlement Body—through a consensus—
rejected the panel’s award because it believed that Alpha had exercised due diligence in the filing of its environmental assessment. However, recognizing that
Beta suffered damage (whether caused 100 percent by Alpha’s cloud seeding,
or whether Alpha’s cloud seeding only exacerbated an existing blizzard), the
Dispute Settlement Body lowered the award amount to $250 million. Under the
threat of trade restrictions if Alpha did not comply with the Dispute Settlement
Body’s ruling, Alpha compensated Beta.
Although this hypothetical situation is simplistic, it provides a glimpse into
the framework of the Treaty. In this hypothetical, Alpha was an industrialized
nation. However, if it were a developing country, Alpha could have used the
Multilateral Fund to receive a grant for the preparation of its environmental assessment. Moreover, the Multilateral Fund could also serve as a subsidy for the
Dispute Settlement Body’s award to Beta. In an effort to discourage negligence
by state actors and ensure repercussions, CENMOD should only subsidize liability awards if it a state actor followed its due diligence throughout the preparation and execution of the environmental modification plan. Otherwise, if Alpha acted recklessly, the threat of trade sanctions would incentivize Alpha to
comply with the Dispute Settlement Body’s ruling.
CONCLUSION
As there is no precedent for the issue of legal accountability for geoengineered catastrophes, or for environmental modification techniques in general,
policymakers must use various fields of international law to find standards to
apply to geoengineering. As the only international treaty addressing environmental modification techniques, ENMOD serves as the foundation for a geoengineering treaty. The Montreal Protocol has demonstrated that the field of international environmental governance is the most effective and applicable field
of international law to provide a sufficient legal framework for geoengineering
regarding enforcement. The TRIPS Agreement provides fundamental principles
that should be adopted for a geoengineering treaty—particularly, the Dispute
198
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Settlement Body. NEPA provides the framework for regulation of environmental modification techniques through the use of Environmental Impact Assessments. All together, ENMOD, the TRIPS Agreement, NEPA, and the Montreal
Protocol contain valuable principles that can be applied to geoengineering and
provide the basis for an international geoengineering treaty that would provide
sufficient legal accountability in the event of a geoengineering catastrophe.

